What lies beneath the waves of government-speak on subs

The government doesn't seem to understand the words it has been saying on submarines. They have committed to a 'competitive evaluation process' for the future submarine project – a term not used in defence circles – and some seem unable to explain the difference between that and an open tender.
 
Fortunately, I'm here to help.
 
Initially, we need to put aside frustration with the fact that we are six years into this project without a basic idea on how it will proceed. We still don't even know how many subs we are building.
 
The other thing to realise is that for some, the future submarine project is as about money and jobs for South Australia as it is about defence requirements. Make-work programs for industry is exactly the wrong way to think about defence procurement: it should be about the best capabilities at the best price – but South Australians in particular don't see it that way.
 
The main contenders for the future sub are an Australian designed and built sub and an evolved sub based on the Japanese Soryu class. Other options include a French or German designed sub, but these seem less likely to succeed at this stage.
 
Keeping those things in mind, it seems like the unspoken motivation of the push for an open tender is largely to try and kill off the Soryu option in favour of a local design and build. There are three reasons for thinking this.
 
First, it is disingenuous to pretend that the Australian option hasn't been given every chance. Aside from the fact that an Australian build was the only firm requirement when the future sub project was first mooted, defence has spent six-plus years working with ASC on the future sub. The progress of the Air Warfare Destroyer project, together with cost and performance issues on the current Collins subs, have raised valid concerns about ASC's ability to deliver the future sub project.
 
Second, it's doubtful the Japanese option is in a formal enough state to be capable of being tendered. A tender requires definite options meeting specified requirements – with costings, timeframes and viable workforce arrangements. Given that an Australian Soryu would have to be negotiated and managed as a joint venture between the Australian and Japanese governments, it is highly unlikely to have any of these things developed.
 
Finally, the tender process has specific probity requirements that inhibit communication between those bidding and those reviewing the tender. Information flow is limited, and communications between individual bidders and the Australian government would be expected to be shared amongst all bidders – something that both inhibits the Soryu option and would rightly concern the Japanese government.
 
A competitive evaluation process – not a formal tender – will allow the government to assess whether the Japanese option is viable or whether we have to go with a local option. This is more likely to produce the best outcome for our defence force, not just those demanding more handouts.

Simon Cowan is a Research Fellow at The Centre for Independent Studies and author of The Future Submarine Project Should Raise Periscope for Another Look.