Nothing to date about the process of acquiring Australia's next generation submarines should fill Australians with confidence about the outcome of the largest defence procurement in Australia's history.
Almost no justification has been provided for the initial decision to acquire 12 submarines – a baffling step when the government budget is stretched and the defence budget is being cut. The original decision to construct the sub fleet in Adelaide was also made for reasons of industry policy and politics, not defence needs. The initial list of expected capabilities was unrealistically high, and alternatives such as acquiring nuclear submarines were unfairly, summarily dismissed.
Worse is that with the first Collins class submarine scheduled to retire in just 10 years' time, the project should already be well under way. Yet we haven't even committed to a conceptual framework for the future submarine, let alone a design.
Instead we are stuck repeating the debates of 2010 about military off the shelf purchases versus a local design option, and comparing a likely refit version of the existing Japanese Soryu class submarine with an Australian designed and built option.
Meeting the 10 year timeframe will be very tough and will add the risks of extending the life of the unreliable Collins class into the project. This could potentially add billions of dollars to the price tag, especially for a local design which will take longer to bring online.
This delay has leveraged up the risk on a project where there was already no risk free option.
Little is known about the capabilities of the Japanese sub, or how well it can be integrated with the US combat systems Australia uses. Until recently, the Japanese defence industry was banned from exporting arms under the Japanese constitution and hence has virtually no export experience.
Moreover there are serious questions about the willingness of Japan to share extremely sensitive technical and IP data with Australia. Future instability in the relationship between Japan and Australia will also be a substantial perpetual risk.
However these challenges pale in comparison with the task of bringing an Australian designed submarine into service. Australia would have to develop not only the skills to build but also design a submarine as well as assume all the risk of failure.
The Joint Strike Fighter project shows how cost and time blowouts can affect a new design defence project. And in that case, the risks are shared among many countries and the project is led by the world's largest defence producer, the United States.
Nevertheless, Australia is about to embark alone on a project more than twice the size of our JSF purchase, knowing we don't yet have the capability to pull the project off. The Future Submarines project is starting behind enemy lines.
Simon Cowan is a Research Fellow at The Centre for Independent Studies.
Home > Commentary > Opinion > Subs project is sinking fast
Subs project is sinking fast
Almost no justification has been provided for the initial decision to acquire 12 submarines – a baffling step when the government budget is stretched and the defence budget is being cut. The original decision to construct the sub fleet in Adelaide was also made for reasons of industry policy and politics, not defence needs. The initial list of expected capabilities was unrealistically high, and alternatives such as acquiring nuclear submarines were unfairly, summarily dismissed.
Worse is that with the first Collins class submarine scheduled to retire in just 10 years' time, the project should already be well under way. Yet we haven't even committed to a conceptual framework for the future submarine, let alone a design.
Instead we are stuck repeating the debates of 2010 about military off the shelf purchases versus a local design option, and comparing a likely refit version of the existing Japanese Soryu class submarine with an Australian designed and built option.
Meeting the 10 year timeframe will be very tough and will add the risks of extending the life of the unreliable Collins class into the project. This could potentially add billions of dollars to the price tag, especially for a local design which will take longer to bring online.
This delay has leveraged up the risk on a project where there was already no risk free option.
Little is known about the capabilities of the Japanese sub, or how well it can be integrated with the US combat systems Australia uses. Until recently, the Japanese defence industry was banned from exporting arms under the Japanese constitution and hence has virtually no export experience.
Moreover there are serious questions about the willingness of Japan to share extremely sensitive technical and IP data with Australia. Future instability in the relationship between Japan and Australia will also be a substantial perpetual risk.
However these challenges pale in comparison with the task of bringing an Australian designed submarine into service. Australia would have to develop not only the skills to build but also design a submarine as well as assume all the risk of failure.
The Joint Strike Fighter project shows how cost and time blowouts can affect a new design defence project. And in that case, the risks are shared among many countries and the project is led by the world's largest defence producer, the United States.
Nevertheless, Australia is about to embark alone on a project more than twice the size of our JSF purchase, knowing we don't yet have the capability to pull the project off. The Future Submarines project is starting behind enemy lines.
Simon Cowan is a Research Fellow at The Centre for Independent Studies.
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